Doing Good While Behaving Badly: Checkout Charity Process Mechanisms

Journal of Business Ethics - Companies are increasingly using cause-related marketing campaigns to engage consumers during the purchase process and highlight their own corporate social...     

General Editor’s Note: Antitrust and Regulatory Update

Review of Industrial Organization -     

Broadening the Concept of International Entrepreneurship: Internationalisation, Networks and Politics

In this article, the situation where a company internationalises over an extended period without changing operation mode is explored. The focus of the empirical research is the Australian company CSR and its large-scale sugar exporting operations, which developed over a period of about 75 years. Because of the highly politicised nature of the sugar industry in many countries, CSR was called upon to make extensive investments in political networks in order to achieve its global sugar exporting operations. Overall the CSR experience demonstrates that it is possible to stretch the use of a given mode, although this may demand considerable creativity in market, network and policy responses of a kind which illustrate that international entrepreneurship may come in many guises, and may need to be viewed in a broader way.     

Global M&A: Still the chocolate industry sweetspot?

Like a dividing cell under the microscope, the American snack food market has split apart into two distinct cells, each with its own unique consumer DNA. The two market segments can best be defined as legacy consumers and next‐generation consumers. This tectonic shift in the confectionery industry may make global industry‐giant mergers more a battle between dinosaurs, lit by meteor light.     

Regulating,joint bargaining,and the demise of precedent

Recent decades have seen a fundamental shift in the nature of economic regulation in the United States. Unauthorized by congress, and largely unnoted in legal and academic circles, regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission have changed the regulatory process by linking otherwise unrelated regulatory issues. Examples include tying merger approval to firm commitments to engage in conceptually unrelated build‐outs and other projects of political importance. This linking of issues has several effects, the most prominent being (a) tying regulatory issues changes the outcomes obtained, plausibly in predictable ways; (b) tying in some circumstances allows regulators to extend their authority to issues for which they have little or no legal authority; and (c) tied regulatory bargaining fails to produce valid legal precedent for firm decision making. We provide an analysis of these conclusions by examining the increasing use of consent decrees, voluntary merger commitments, and merger conditions by the Federal Communications Commission, referencing our discussion with a simple model of joint bargaining applicable to regulatory practice.     

To push performance,check the leader’s power motive

The power motive, defined as the desire to impact the behavior and emotions of another person, has long been controversial. On one side, the exercise of power has been put forth as a fundamental human need greater in strength than the need to survive. On the other, it has been vilified for its potentially devastating consequences. We argue the latter view is distorted, and, by relying too heavily on it, we have come to misunderstand the essential nature of power and its use by leaders charged with driving performance. It is not the power motive that leads to corruption and tyranny, but rather how the power motive is channeled into behavior by other personality factors. Consequently, those charged with leader selection should place greater emphasis on how individuals with strong power motives differ in how they channel power. Doing so will support the selection of executives best equipped to deliver organizational performance.     

When it pays to have a friend on the inside: contingent effects of buyer advocacy on B2B suppliers

As organizational buying systems grow more complex and sophisticated, suppliers increasingly rely on buyer advocacy: an individual buyer’s efforts to influence his/her colleagues such that the supplier’s standing is improved. Drawing from cognitive response theory, the authors hypothesize an inverted U-shaped relationship between a buyer’s advocacy for a supplier and the customer’s purchases from that supplier. They theorize that this effect is moderated by the advocate’s industry experience and customer–supplier relationship characteristics. An analysis of multisource data from a B2B service provider (Study 1) supports the predicted inverted U-shaped relationship, while a unique dataset from a large industrial supplier (Study 2) provides broad support for the hypothesized moderators. Finally, a randomized experiment (Study 3) replicates key findings and corroborates the theorized cognitive response mechanisms. Findings contribute to the limited literature on buyer advocacy within the organizational buying domain and offer practical implications for suppliers and buyers.

     

Econometrics and equilibrium models

In Rational Econometric Man, Edward Nell and Karim Errouaki present a welcome and timely case for the view that econometrics and econometric model-building may not be the magic tools to solve all empirical questions despite what many seem to have thought they were in the 1960s. Here I examine some possible problems with econometric models that have to do with their usually taking the form of equilibrium models. Some of these problems were recognized by Trygve Haavelmo decades ago. And as Aris Spanos has recently discussed, the problems are often the result of what we say in our textbooks. Some problems have to do with what we mean by econometric parameters and others with how we use probabilities.